

## **Particulars, Universals, and States of Affairs**

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### *Abstract*

The paper examines Armstrong's theses about particulars and their relation to universals and states of affairs. Sec. I argues that there are no sufficient reasons for but good reasons against accepting the distinction between thin and thick particulars. The distinction is partially supported by the thesis that universals are parts of their particular instances. Sec. II claims that there are some difficulties with explaining in what sense universals are parts of their instances. If thin particulars are given up, there is no need for states of affairs. Sec. III aims at showing that the truthmaker argument for states of affairs is not successful and that, once thin particulars have been given up, even a refined version of the truthmaker argument fails. Reference is mainly to the books *Universals* and *A World of States of Affairs* and to the forthcoming paper „How do Particulars stand to Universals?“ which explains what might be called the Armstrong-Baxter-Theory of instantiation as partial identity.