Fabian Stöhr
Are we more free and more responsible when our actions flow from an Inner Self?
About Me
The subject matter of freedom of the will has captured my interest during much of my studies. In particular, I placed my focus on the discussion, initiated by Harry Frankfurt, on whether compatibilist freedom and responsibility require more than the origination of our behavior from the will. My bachelor's thesis thus deals with Harry Frankfurt's theory of volition. I completed my master's degree, which was awarded the University of Konstanz Alumni Association Prize in 2018, with a thesis on Susan Wolf's "Freedom within Reason."
My dissertation, under the supervision of Jacob Rosenthal and Peter Stemmer, revolves around this same topic. Independently of my dissertation, I work as "Toolmaster for Digitally Enhanced Teaching" within the E-Learning Team at the University of Konstanz. (My contact information can be found there.)
Dissertation
My dissertation looks at the question of whether an agent's full freedom and responsibility are ensured solely by the origination of an action from the will. I aim to investigate whether there are other elements within our psychological makeup from which actions need to originate in order for the agent to possess full freedom and responsibility.
I argue that, depending on how we understand the concept "will", there are indeed such additional requirements. While we are partially free and responsible with regard to any action originating from our will, complete freedom and responsibility require origination from something that is deeply ingrained within ourselves to a degree that the will not always is.
I refer to theories of the type I attempt to develop as Inner Self Views, a term loosely derived from Susan Wolf's "Real Self View" terminology. Such theories seek to account for freedom and responsibility being diminished in cases of internal constraints, such as cases of addiction, anxiety, phobias, and compulsive behavior.
My dissertation develops such an Inner Self View.
It places particular emphasis on the practice of self-reference and on the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental states while taking into account a more intricate model of the mind that is sometimes referred to as "Dual System Theory" and "Dual Process Theory" in Psychology.
Rather than concentrating on the incompatibilist arguments that have been raised in the debate against Inner Self Views such as this one, it focusses on defending it against both competing Inner Self Views and the view that origination from the will is always sufficient for full freedom and responsibility.