Beau Mount

Assistant professor

Beau Madison Mount

After finishing my DPhil on the philosophy of mathematics at the University of Oxford in 2018, I was a Junior Research Fellow at New College from 2018–2020 and joined the University of Konstanz in Sommersemester 2020. My DPhil thesis, The Kinds of Mathematical Objects, defended anti-reductionism: the thesis that not all mathematical objects are sets. My current work spans several areas of formal philosophy, including the philosophy of set theory, theories of truth, and formal epistemology. Some projects include a paper on reflection principles, large cardinals, and their relationship to Georg Kreisel's arguments for the bivalence of certain classes of sentences of set theory; a paper on applications of real-valued measurable cardinals in metaphysics; and collaborative papers on disentangled theories of truth (with Daniel Waxman) and on the epistemology of absolutely unrestricted quantification (with Rachel Fraser).

Before becoming an analytic philosopher, I studied English, French, and German literature at Duke University and Princeton University and German Idealism at the Université de Paris IV–Sorbonne, and I retain side interests in aesthetics and the history of philosophy (particularly Leibniz and early twentieth-century philosophy), as well as the applied ethics of just war theory and nuclear deterrence.


Teaching

Teaching (previous semesters)

Publications

[2021] 'Stable and Unstable Theories of Truth and Syntax'. Mind, Volume 130, Issue 518: 439–473,

[2021] `Invariance without Extensionality'. In The Semantic Conception of Logic: Essays on Consequence, Invariance, and Meaning, ed. Jack Woods and Gil Sagi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press): 80-96.

[2019] `Antireductionism and Ordinals'. Philosophia Mathematica 27: 105–24.

[2017] `Ordinals and Versions of Indefinite Extensibility (Abstract)'. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 23: 206–7.

[2016] `We Turing Machines Can't Even Be Locally Ideal Bayesians'. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy  5: 285–90.

[2015] `Higher-Order Abstraction Principles'. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4: 228–36.