Concepts and the A Priori
University of Constance, 17–19 June
“The Paradox of the Limitless A Priori” by George Bealer
Speakers
George Bealer, Manuel Garcia Carpintero, David Chalmers, David Henderson, Ruth Millikan, Nenad Miscevic, Albert Newen, David Papineau, Scott Sturgeon
Commentators
Hans Kamp, Andreas Kemmerling, Axel Klie, Manfred Kupffer, Bruno Mölder, Holger Sturm, Susanna Siegel, Wolfgang Spohn, Bernhard Thoele
Programme
Thursday, 17th
From 13.15 Registration
14.15–16.00 OPENING LECTURE George Bealer: “A New Theory of Concepts and the A Priori”
COFFEEBREAK
16.15–18.00 David Henderson: “Concepts and How to Make Them Talk”, Commentary: Bruno Mölder
Friday, 18th
9.00-10.45 David Chalmers: “Concepts and the Scrutability of Truth”
COFFEEBREAK
11.15–13.00 David Papineau: “Two-Dimensional Semantics and Physicalism”, Commentary: Bernhard Thoele
LUNCHBREAK
14.15–16.00 Scott Sturgeon: “Concepts and the A Priori”, Commentary: Susanna Siegel
COFFEEBREAK
16.30–18.00 Manfred Kupffer: “I am now here”
Saturday, 19th
9.00–10.45 Manuel Garcia-Carpintero: “A Priori Knowledge in Understanding Demonstratives”, Commentary: Andreas Kemmerling
COFFEEBREAK
11.15–13.00 Albert Newen: “Perception-based Concepts and A Priori Knowledge”, Commentary: Axel Klie
LUNCHBREAK
14.15–16.00 Nenad Miscevic: “Empirical Concepts and A Priori Truth”, Commentary: Wolfgang Spohn
COFFEEBREAK
16.30–18.15 Ruth Millikan: “On the Epistemology of Concepts”, Commentary: Hans Kamp
NOTICE: Ruth Millikan will also speak in the departmental colloquium on Thursday, June 17, 18.30 (room: A 701) about “Crossing Levels of Purpose”.
Philosophy of Mathematics: 100 years of Hilbert’s “problem speech”
(as part of the GAP-Conference “Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy 4”)
Germany, University of Bielefeld, 28–29 September 2000
A hundred years ago – more precisely on August the 8th in 1900, two days later then originally planned – David Hilbert addressed in Paris the 2nd International Congress of Mathematicians with his famous ‘problem address.’ In the general introductory remarks of this lecture, Hilbert for the first time made public his views about mathematics: how it evolves historically, how it proceeds systematically and what its characteristic features as a human enterprise are. Most of what he stated there reemerged later within his own foundational work which became known as “Hilbert’s program” and which has heavily influenced 20th century work in the foundations and the philosophy of mathematics.
The GAP-Workshop “Philosophy of Mathematics”, organized by members of the DFG-Forschergruppe ‘Logik in der Philosophie’/Research Group ‘Logic in Philosophy’ will proceed along two lines. Commemorating the centenary of Hilbert’s famous ‘problem address’ one section will present talks which tackle foundational and philosophical themes of Hilbert’s lecture from various viewpoints, both historical as well as systematic in nature. A second section will be open to any current issue in the philosophy of mathematics. Both sections will feature invited and contributed talks. Conference languages are German and English.
For more information concerning the GAP, the German Society for Analytical Philosophy see their homepage, and concerning the DFG-Research Groupsee their homepages in Konstanz and Tübingen.
Intentionalität zwischen Subjektivität und Weltbezug
23.–24. März 2000 Universität Konstanz
Programm
Donnerstag, 23. März 2000
9.15 Begrüßung 9.30 ANSGAR BECKERMANN, Bielefeld „Warum verwenden wir bei der Zuschreibung von intentionalen Zuständen Dass-Sätze?“, Kommentar: FRANK HOFMANN, Tübingen
11.00 Kaffeepause
11.15 ANDREAS KEMMERLING, Heidelberg „Über die Objektivität von Glaubenssätzen“, Kommentar: MANFRED KUPFFER, Konstanz
12.45 MITTAGSPAUSE
14.15 HANS KAMP, Stuttgart „Einfach und mehrfach verankerte Repräsentationen: Denken de re, Wiedererkennen und Wissen, wer jemand ist“, Kommentar: MARK TEXTOR, Hamburg
15.45 Kaffeepause
16.00 GEORG MEGGLE, Leipzig „Anti-Individualismus und Gricesches Programm“, Kommentar: MARK SIEBEL, Leipzig
17.30 Allgemeine Diskussion
18.30 ENDE der Diskussion
Freitag, 24. März 2000
9.30 HEINZ-DIETER HECKMANN, Saarbrücken „Funktionalismus und Intentionalität“, Kommentar: NIKOLA KOMPA, München
11.00 Kaffeepause
11.15 THOMAS METZINGER, Essen „Transparente und opake Formen phänomenaler Selbstrepräsentation“, Kommentar: ALBERT NEWEN, Bonn
12.45 MITTAGSPAUSE
14.15 GIANFRANCO SOLDATI, Canobbio „Selbstwissen und primitives Selbstbewußtsein“, Kommentar: KATIA SAPORITI, Bielefeld
15.45 Kaffeepause
16.00 MARTINE NIDA-RÜMELIN, Fribourg „Phänomenale versus nicht-phänomenale Überzeugungen“, Kommentar: UWE MEYER, Münster
17.30 Allgemeine Diskussion
18.30 ENDE der Diskussion
Theories of Truth, Necessity and Provability
18–20 November 1999 University of Leuven, Belgium
Institute of Philosophy
University of Leuven
Kardinaal Mercierplein 2
B-3000 Leuven
Belgium
The notions of truth, necessity and provability are philosophically important concepts that are subject to paradoxes. The concept of truth is affected by the age-old liar paradox, whereas the concepts of necessity and knowability (and informal provability) are affected by variants of the so-called paradox of the knower (Kaplan and Montague). These paradox-engendering arguments are strikingly similar: they can all be classified as diagonal arguments. Therefore these paradoxes appear to be intimately related and one would expect of a theory of the paradoxes that it gives a uniform solution to the semantic, epistemic and alethic paradoxes.
Logical as well as philosophical theories of truth, necessity and (informal) provability have been advanced in the literature. For instance, on the philosophical side deflationary theories of truth have been influential in recent years, whereas on the logical side we have witnessed considerable progress in axiomatic approaches to the concept of truth. Unfortunately, the logical and the more philosophical approaches have so far remained to a large extent separate from each other. It seems that both sides (the logical and the philosophical) have much to learn from each other.
Another emphasis will be put on deflationist and disquotationalist theories of truth. This research area has flourished in recent years and recently proof-theoretic results have turned out to be relevant for the discussion. This is another field where philosophers can provide motivation for formal investigations and the latter can be employed by philosophers for solutions of their problems.
The aim of the conference is to foster interaction between, and, if possible, integration of logical and philosophical theories of truth, necessity and knowability. It is expected that the paradoxes play an important role in the papers that are presented at the conference.
Speakers
John Burgess (Princeton), Andrea Cantini (Firenze), Hartry Field (NYU), Volker Halbach (Konstanz), Leon Horsten (Leuven), Paul Horwich (London), Hannes Leitgeb (Salzburg), Vann McGee (MIT), Michael Sheard (St. Lawrence), Albert Visser (Utrecht)
Programme
Thursday, 18 Nov. | Friday, 19 Nov. | Saturday, 20 Nov. | |
---|---|---|---|
9.30–11.00 | Albert Visser (Utrecht) Truth & Proof: Logic against Philosophy? | John Burgess (Princeton) Is There a Problem about Deflationary Theories of Truth? | |
11.15–12.45 | Leon Horsten (Leuven) An Axiomatic Investigation of Provability as a Primitive Predicate | Hannes Leitgeb (Salzburg) Metaworlds: A Possible Worlds Semantics of Truth | |
Lunch | Lunch | ||
14.15–15.45 | Andrea Cantini (Firenze) Partial Truth: History, Applications and Problems | Michael Sheard (St. Lawrence) Provability, Truth, and Naive Criteria | |
16.00–17.30 | Volker Halbach (Konstanz) Modalized Disquotationalism | Closing Lecture Paul Horwich (London) A Defense of Deflationism | |
Break | |||
18.00–19.30 | Welcoming by Opening Lecture | Vann McGee (MIT) Ramsey and the Correspondence Theory |
Coherence and Dynamics of Belief
February, 5.–7.
University of Constance
The conference is the first organized by the research group Logic in Philosophy at Constance and Tübingen.
The conference will be on the role of coherence in epistemology and topics in the theory of belief change related to coherence. The aim is to bring together philosophers as well as logicians working in this area. A list of possible topics includes:
- coherentist theories of justification
- formal modellings of coherence
- decision theoretic approaches to rational acceptance
- belief revision
- doxastic logic probabilist approaches to rational belief change
- Gettier problem
The conference language is English.
Speakers
Thomas Bartelborth (Leipzig), Wolfgang Benkewitz (Konstanz), Elke Brendel (Berlin), Thomas Grundmann (Tübingen), Volker Halbach (Konstanz), Sven-Ove Hansson (Uppsala), Matthias Hild (Cambridge), Dirk Koppelberg (Berlin), Keith Lehrer (Tucson), Sten Lindström (Umea), Karl-Georg Niebergall (München), Erik Olsson (Konstanz), Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund), Hans Rott (Amsterdam), Richard Schantz (Berlin), Krister Segerberg (Uppsala), Wolfgang Spohn (Konstanz), Renata Wassermann (Amsterdam)
Programme
Thursday, February 5 | Friday, February 6 | Saturday, February 7 | |
---|---|---|---|
9.00–10.15 | Wolfgang Spohn (Konstanz) Some Coherence Principles and Their Justification | Volker Halbach (Konstanz) On Lehrer's Principle of Trustworthiness | Hans Rott (Amsterdam) Coherence and conservatism in strategies for theory change |
10.15–11.30 | Richard Schantz (Berlin) The role of sensory experience in epistemic justification: A problem for coherentism | Erik Olsson (Konstanz) Coherentist Justification: From Theory-sketch to Actual Theory | Sven-Ove Hansson (Uppsala) A Survey of Non-Prioritized Belief Revision |
Break | |||
11.45–13.00 | Wolfgang Benkewitz (Konstanz) Belief Justification and Perception | Elke Brendel (Berlin) Coherence Theories of Knowledge and the Gettier Problem | Renata Wassermann (Amsterdam) Resource-Bounded Belief Revision |
Lunch | |||
14.15–15.30 | Thomas Bartelborth (Leipzig) Coherence and Explanation | Karl-Georg Niebergall (München) Nonmonotonic Theory Extension in Arithmetic | Dirk Koppelberg (Berlin) Why Epistemic Justification Cannot Be Restricted to Inferential Relations among Beliefs |
15.30–16.45 | Matthias Hild (Cambridge) Diachronic Coherence and Learning from Evidence | Krister Segerberg (Uppsala) Expansion, revision, update, default | Thomas Grundmann (Tübingen) BonJour’s self-defeating argument for coherentism |
Break | |||
17.00–18.15 | Wlodek Rabinowicz (Lund) and Sten Lindström (Umea) DDL unlimited | John Cantwell (Uppsala) Probability, acceptability and belief | |
18.15–20.00 | Keith Lehrer (Arizona) The Coherence Theory of Knowledge |
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